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[L. A.. No. 22889. In Bank. A.pr. 28,1955.1

RUTH M. WORTHLEY, Appellant, v. EDWARD J.
WORTHLEY J Respondent.
[1] Divorce-Foreign Decrees-Full Faith and Credit.-Divoree
decree obtained by husband in Nevada after wife's prior New
Jersey decree for separate maintenance, being regular on its
face, must be accorded full faith and credit in California
where wife does not question its validity.
[2] Id.-Foreign Decrees-Effect of Divorce on Prior Decree for
Separate Maintenance.-Since full faith and credit clause
compels recognition of divorce decree obtained by husband
in Nevada only as adjUdication of marital status of parties and
. not of property rights that may be incident to such status,
effect of dissolution of marriage on husband's preexisting obligations under prior New Jersey decree for separate maintenance obtained by wife must be determined by New Jersey
law.
[8] Id.-Foreign Decrees-Meet of Divorce on Prior Decree for
Separate Maintenance.-Husband's obligations under New Jersey decree are not terminated by dissolution of marriage
effected by Nevada court ill divorce proceeding instituted by
husband in which personal jurisdiction over wife was not
obtained.
[4] Id.-Foreign Decrees-Judgment for Sepa.ra.te Maintenance.Since New Jersey decree for separate maintenance obtained
by wife is both prospectively and retroactively modifiable,
California court is not constitutionally bound either to enforce
or not to enforce husband's obligations under such decree.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d. Divorce and Separation,§ 312 et seq.; Am..
Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 740 et seq.
[2] Foreign divorce as affecting local order previously entered
for separate maintenance, note, 1 A.L.R.2d 1423.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Divorce, § 304; [4,7-9,11] Divorce,
1306; [5] Courts, § 94; [6] Cow'ta, § 110; [10] Evidence, 131.
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[6] Courts-Decisions as Precedents.-Cases are not authority for
propositions not considered therein.
[6] Id.-Decisions as Precedents.-Propositions ot law laid down
in opinions of District Courts of Appeal are not binding on
Supreme Court.
['1] Divorce-Foreign Decrees-Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act.-In proceedings commenced pursuant to provisions of Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(Code Civ. Pl'OC., § 1650-1690) California courts must recognize
and enforce foreign alimony and support decrees whether modifiable or not (§ 1670), and must afford defendant an opportunity to litigate issue of modification (§ 1682).
[8] Id.-Foreign Decrees-Enforcement.-Where both parties are
before California court, it may not properly refuse to hear
plaintiff's prayer for enforcement of modifiable sister-state
decree for separate maintenance and defendant's plea for
modification of his obligations thereunder; if accrued installments are modified retroactively, judgment for liquidated sum
entered after such modification will be final and thus entitled
to full faith and credit in other states; and if installments are
modified prospectively, issues thus determined will be res
judicata so long as circumstances of parties remain unchanged.
[9] Id.-Foreign Decrees-Modification.-Issue of modification ot
foreign maintenance or support decree need not, as matter of
practical convenience, be tried in courts of state where such
decree was originally rendered.
[10] Evidence-Judicial Notice-Laws of Foreign State.-Law of
state in which support obligation originated can be judicially
noticed (Code Civ. Proc., § 1875) and applied by California
courts.
[11] Divorce-Foreign Decrees-Enforcement.-In action to enforce modifiable support obligation either party may tender
and litigate any plea for modification that could be presented
to courts of state where alimony or support decree was originally rendered.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. John Gee Clark, Judge. Reversed.
Action to enforce jUdgment of court of another state for
separate maintenance. Judgment for defendant reversed.
Kenny & Morris and Robert W. Kenny for Appellant.
Slane, Mantaliea & Davis and Frank Barclay for Respondent.
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Courts, § 116 et ieq.; Am.Jur. Courta, §"

e&aeq.
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TRA YNOR, J .-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment barring
further prosecution of this action. The judgment was entered
after a trial of defendant's special defense (ClIde Civ. Proc.,
§ 597) to plaintiff's complaint for prospective and retroactive
enforcement of defendant's obligations under a separate
maintenance decree entered in the New Jersey Court of
Chancery on May 19, 1947. Plaintiff and defendant were
married in New Jersey in March 1943, and separated in
November 1946. In the action for separate maintenance
defendant appeared personally and by counsel, and the decree
ordered him to pay $9.00 a week for plaintiff's support.
About ten months after the decree was entered, defendant
left New Jersey for Nevada, and in March 1948 he commenced
an action for divorce in that state. Although plaintiff was
served in New Jersey with summons and a copy of the
complaint in the Nevada action, she did not appear therein.
On JUly 7, 1948, the Nevada Second .Judicial District Court
granted defendant a divorce.
Defendant had paid all of the sums due under the New
Jersey decree at the time the divorce was granted by the
Nevada court but made no further payments thereafter. The
Nevada decree contained no provision for alimony. On
November 16, 1951, plaintiff commenced this action in the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the county of defendant's present residence. She alleged that the New Jersey
decree "has become final and has never been vacated, modified,
or set aside" and that defendant is delinquent in his payments thereunder in the amount of $1,089. She seeks a
judgment for the accrued arrearages and asks that the New
Jersey decree be established as a California decree and that
defendant be ordered to pay her $9.00 a week until further
order of the court. Defendant answered the complaint by a
general denial and by alleging, as an affirmative defense, that
the Nevada divorce decree had terminated his obligations
under the earlier New Jersey separate maintenance decree.
On defendant's motion, the affirmative defense was tried first
under the procedure established by section 597 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. The trial court concluded that the Nevada
decree dissolved the marriage and was therefore a bar to the
maintenance of an action to enforce defendant's obligations
under the New Jersey decree.
[1] Since plaintiff does not question the validity of the
divorce granted by the Nevada court, that decree, being
regular OD its face, must be accorded full faith and credit
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in this state. (Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287
[63 8.0t. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279, 143 A.L.R. 1273]; Ibid., 325
U.S. 226 [65 8.0t. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577, 157 A.L.R. 1366].)
The controlling questions on this appeal are, therefore, (1)
whether the dissolution of the marriage terminated defendant's obligations under the New Jersey decree and, if not,
(2) whether and to what extent those obligations are enforceable in this state.
[2] Since the full faith and credit clause compels recognition of the Nevada decree only as an adjudication of the
marital status of plaintiff and defendant and not of any
property rights that may be incident to that status (Estin v.
Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 548-549 [68 8.0t. 1213, 92 L.Ed. 1561,
1 A.L.R.2d 1412]), the effect of the dissolution of the marriage
on defendant's preexisting obligations under the New Jersey
maintenance decree must be determined by the law of New
Jersey. (Ibid.; Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 406, 409 [72
8.0t. 398, 96 L.Ed. 448] ; Bie'Wend v. Bie'Wend, 17 Ca1.2d 108,
111, 114 [109 P.2d 701, 132 A.L.R. 1264].) [3] The
Supreme Court of that state has recently held that a New
Jersey "decree for maintenance [is not] superseded by a
judgment of the foreign state where jurisdiction has only
been obtained by publication entered in an ex parte proceeding in which in personam jurisdiction over the wife to whom
the maintenance decree runs was not obtained." (Isserman
v. Isserman, 11 N.J. 106 [93 A.2d 571, 575],) We must
therefore conclude that defendant's obligations under the
New Jersey decree were not terminated by the dissolution
of the marriage effected by the Nevada court in a proceeding
in which personal jurisdiction over plaintiff was not obtained.
The second question is more difficult. [4] Since the New
Jersey decree is both prospectively and retroactively modifiable (N.J.S. § 2A :34-23 [1951]), we are not constitutionally
bound to enforce defendant's obligations under it. (Sistare
v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 [30 8.0t. 682, 54 L.Ed. 905, 28 L.R.
A.N.S. 1068] ; Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 [21 S~Ot. 555,
45 L.Ed. 810]; Barber v. Barber, 21 How. (U.S.) 582 [16
L.Ed. 226].)- Nor are we bound not to enforce them.
-In reccnt cases the United States Supreme Court has expressly reserved judgment on the question of full faith and credit to modifiable
judgments and decrees (see Barber v. Eal'ber, 323 U.S. 77, 81 [65 S.Ct.
137, 89 L.Ed. 82, 157 A.L.R. 163]; Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 234
[66 S.Ct. 556, 90 L.Ed. 635]; but Bee lJalvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610,
615 [67 s.Ot. 903, 91 L.Ed. 1133]), and the late Mr. Justice Jackson, a
fOl"eIn08t expounder of the law of full faith and credit ill recent yeara,
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(Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 615 [67 8.Ot. 903, 91 L.Ed.
1133] ; Oummings v. Oummings, 97 Cal.App. 144, 151 [275
P. 245].) The United States Supreme Court has held, however, that if such obligations are enforced in this state, at
least as to accrued arrearages, due process requires that the
defendant be afforded an opportunity to litigate the question
of modification. (Griffin· v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 233-234
[66 8.Ct. 556, 90 L.Ed. 635] ; see also Gough v. Gough, 101
Cal.App.2d 262, 267-268 [225 P.2d 668].) It has also clearly
indicated that as to either prospective or retroactive enforcement of such obligations, this state "has at least as much
leeway to disregard the judgment, to qualify it, or to depart
from it as does the State where it was rendered." (Halvey v.
Halvey, supra, 330 U.S. 610, 615.)
In Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Ca1.2d 108, 113-114 [l09 P.2d
701, 132 A.L.R. 1264], it was held that the California courts
will recognize and give prospective enforcement to a foreign
alimony decree, even though it is subject to modification under
the law of the state where it was originally rendered, by
establishing it "as the decree of the California court with
the same force and effect as if it had been entered in this
state, including punishment for contempt if the defendant
fails to comply. [Citations.]" Similar holdings in reference to both alimony and support decrees have repeatedly
.been made by the District Courts of Appeal (see the cases
cited in Biewend v. Biewend, supra, 17 Ca1.2d at 113; see
also Starr v. Starr, 121 Cal.App.2d 633 [263 P.2d 675]
[modifying prospectively a Nevada decree for child support] ;
Toohey v. Toohey, 97 Cal.App.2d 84, 87 [217 P.2d 108];
Tomkins v. Tomkins, 89 Cal.App.2d 243, 250 [200 P.2d 821])
and by the courts of other states (Sackler v. Sackler (Fla.),
47 So.2d 292, 294-295 [18 A.L.R.2d 856] ; Rule v. Rule,
313 Ill.App. 108 [39 N.E.2d 379]; Matson v. Matson, 186
Iowa 607, 625 [173 N.W. 127]; Fanchier v. Gammill, 148
Miss. 723, 737 [114 So. 813] ; Little v. Little, 146 Misc. 231,
233 [262 N.Y.S. 654], affirmed without opinion, 236 App.
Div. 826 [259 N.Y.S. 973], rearg. den., 237 App.Div. 817
forcefully declared that modifiable alimony and support decrees are
within the scope of that clause: " Neither the full faith and credit
clause of the constitution nor the Act of Congress implementing it says
anything about final judgments or, for that matter, about any judgments.
Both require that full faith and credit be given to 'judicial proceedings'
without limitation as to finality. Upon recognition of the broad meaning of that term much may 80Illf'(by depend."
(Concurring opinion,
Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77,87 [65 S.Ct. 137, 89 L.Ed. 82, 157 A.L.R.

163].)
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[260 N.Y.S. 981]; Lockman v. Lockman, 220 N.C 95, 98
[16 S.E.2d 670] ; Oousineau v. Oousineau, 155 Ore. 184, 201202 [63 P.2d 897]; Johnson v. Johnson, 194 S.C. 115 [8
S.E.2d 351, 354] ; Sorensen v. Spence, 65 S.D. 134 [272 N.W.
179, 180-181] ; McKeel v. McICeel, 185 Va. 108, 113 [37 S.E.
2d 746] ; see also ICnwaml v. J(1'uvand (Fla.), 59 So.2d 857;
Ostrander v. Ostrander, 190 Minn. 547, 549-550 [252 N.W.
449]; Shibley v. Shibley, 181 \Vash. 166 [42 P.2d 446].) It
was stated in the Biewend case, however, that the Missouri
decree would be established as a decree of the California
courts "until such time as the Missouri court modifies itJJ
decree." (17 Ca1.2d 108, 114.) On reconsideration we have
concluded, for reasons that appear below, that this state!tlent
was erroneous insofar as it implied that the California e.ourts
will not try the issue of modification on its merits, and that
the courts of this state should undertake to try sneh issues.·
The District Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate
District in a recent case has prospectively modifit!d a support
obligation created in a Nevada decree. (Starr v. Starr, supra,
121 Cal.App.2d 633.) In that case the plaintiff-wife obtained
a divorce in Nevada in 1949, at which time she was awarded
\!ustody of her minor child and the defenda.ut-husband was
ordered to contribute $25 per month towaId the support of
the child. Subsequently the wife and child became residents
of California, and in 1951 she brought an action asking that
the husband's support payments be increased to $75 per
month. In affirming the trial court's order increasing the
husband's obligation to $75 per month, the District Court
of Appeal drew an analogy to Sampsell v. Super·ior Oourt,
32 Ca1.2d 763 [197 P.2d 739], in which it was held that
custody rights established in one state were modifiable in
any other state that had jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The court concluded that if the California courts could modify the custody rights created in the Nevada decree, there
was no reason why the support obligation created in the
same decree could not also be modified. Similarly, the courts
of a number of other states have affirmed their willingness
to undertake prospective modification of alimony and support
obligations created in sister-state decrees. (See Blauvelt v.
Blauvelt, 199 Ark. 710 [136 S.W.2d 201, 204J; Sackler v.
·Similarly, IIandscllY v. l1and;;;chy, 32 Ca1.App.2d 504 [90 P.2d 123].
and Rarns v. Barns, 9 CaJ.App.2d 427 rriO P.2d 4631. are disapproved
insofar as they are ineonsistcnt with this opinion on the question of the
li~abilitl of the isaue of moditication.
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Hackler, (Fla.), supra, 47 So.2d 292, 294-295 [18 A.L.R.2d
856] ; Lopez v. Avery (Fla.), 66 So.2d 689, 693; Durfee v.
Durfee, 293 Mass. 472, 477-479 [200 N.E. 395] ; Turnage v.
Tyler, 183 Miss. 318 [184 So. 52] ; Robison v. Robison, 9 N.J.
288 [88 A.2d 202, 204], cert. den. 344 U.S. 829 [73 8.Ct. 33,
97 L.Ed. 645] ; Johnson v. Johnson, 196 S.C. 474 [13 S.E.2d
593, 595-596, 134 A.L.R. 318] ; Setzer v. Setzer, 251 Wis. 234,
236-237 [29 N.W.2d 62], citing Halvey v. Halvey, supra, 330
U.S. 610, 615; see also Barclay v. Marston, 123 N.Y.S.2d 196,
aff'd. without opinion, 127 N.Y.S.2d 842.)
Although the question of retroactive modification has been
seldom litigated, the United States Supreme Court has expressed its approval of the proposition that actions to enforce retroactively modifiable decrees sho"lld be tried in a
forum that has personal jurisdiction over both parties, and
that in the trial of such actions the defendant must be afforded
an opportunity to set up any mitigating defenses that would
be available to him if the suit were brought in the state
where the alimony or support decree was originally rendered.
(Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 233-234 [66 8.Ct. 556, 90
L.Ed. 635] ; see also Gough v. Go-ugh, 101 Cal.App.2d 262,
267-268 [225 P.2d 668].) The same rule has been expressed
by the Supreme Court of New Jersey (0 'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin, 6 N.J. 170 [78 A.2d 64, 68-69] ; see also Johnson v. Johnso-n, 196 S.C. 474 [13 S.E.2d 593, 595-596, 134 A.L.R. 318] ;
Robison v. Robison, supra, 9 N.J. 288 [88 A.2d 202, 204],
cert. den. 344 U.S. 829 [73 S.Ct. 33, 97 L.Ed. 645]), and its
adoption has been commended by scholars who have recently
studied the problem. (See Scoles, I t Enforcement of Foreign
'Non-Final' Alimo-ny and Support Orders," 53 Columb.L.
Rev. 817, 823-825; Ehrenzweig, "lnierstate Recognitio-n of
Support Duties," 42 Cal.L.Rev. 382, 393-394.)
It is contended, however, that a contrary rule has been
established in California by MacDonald v. Butler, 68 Cal.
App.2d 120 [156 P.2d 273]. That case was an action to
recover installments accrued under a retroactively modifiable
Michigan decree for the support of minor children. The
District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of dismissal
entered on defendant'8 demurrer to the complaint, and it
is contended that because the case was decided on demurrer
it necessarily holds that no cause of action was stated under
full faith and credit, comity, or otherwise. This contention
reflects a failure to distinguish between the decision as res
jGdicata aDd as .t.. ae~is. [5] It is well established
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that "cases are not authority for propositions not considered
therein" (Metcalf v. Oounty of Los Angeles, 24 Cal.2d 267,
273 [148 P.2d 645]; see also Maguire v. Hiberrvia Save &L. Soc., 23 Cal.2d 719, 730 [146 P.2d 673, 151 A.L.R. 1062] ;
Mortgage Guaranty 00. v. Ohotiner, 8 Cal.2d 110, 114 [64
P.2d 138, 108 A.L.R. 1080]; Oate v. Fresno Traction 00.,
213 Cal. 190, 202-203 [2 P .2d 364]; Webster v. Fall, 266
U.S. 507,511 [45 8.Ct. 148,69 L.Ed. 411]; Schram v. Robertson, (9 Cir.) 111 F.2d 722, 725) and, since the report of
the MacDonald case clearly indicates that it was argued and
decided solely on the question of full faith and credit, its
authority as precedent is limited to the decision on that
question. [6] Moreover, propositions of law laid down in
opinions of the District Courts of Appeal are not binding
on this court. (Western L. 00. v. State Board of Equalization, 11 Ca1.2d 156, 167-168 [78 P.2d 731, 117 A.L.R. 838] ;
Shelton V. Oity of Los Angeles, 206 Cal. 544, 550 [275 P.
421] ; People v. Rabe, 202 Cal. 409, 418-419 [261 P. 303];
1n re Stevens, 197 Cal. 408, 423-424 [241 P. 88]; Bohn V.
Bohn, 164 Cal. 532, 537-538 [129 P. 981]; People V. Daw,
147 Cal. 346, 350 [81 P. 718].)
It is suggested that even if there are no binding California
authorities on the question, we should follow certain sisterstate decisions holding that alimony and support obligations
created by a prospectively and retroactively modifiable decree
are enforceable only in the state in which the decree was rendered. The policy implicit in those decisions is that a modifiable duty of support in one state" is of no special interest to
other states and . . . is not enforceable elsewhere under principles of Conflict of Laws. "
(Rest., Conflict of Laws,
§ 458, comment a.) This policy was rejected by this court in
the Biewend case (see also Hiner v. Hiner, 153 Cal. 254, 257
[94 P. 1044]) and by the Legislature of this state in enacting
the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. (Code
Civ. Proc., §§ 1650-1690.) [7] In proceedings commenced
pursuant to the provisions of that act, the California courts
must recognize and enforce foreign alimony and support decrees whether modifiable or not (Code Civ. Proc., § 1670), and
must afford the defendant an opportWlity to litigate the issue
of modification. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1682; Griffin V. Griffin,
supra, 327 U.S. 220, 233-234.) If we should now refuse to
follow the policy expressed by the Legislature in the Uniform
Act, and by this court and the United States Supreme Court
in the Sampsell and Griffin cases, and should hold that even
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though the courts of this state have personal jurisdiction over
the defendant, his obligations under a prospectively and retroactively modifiable sister-state support decree cannot be enforced in this state, the result would be anomalous. There would
then be two rules in California, one for proceedings commenced under the Uniform Act, and a contrary one for all
other proceedings to enforce foreign-created alimony and
support obligations.
[8] Moreover, there is no valid reason, in a case in which
both parties are before the court, why the California courts
should refuse to hear a plaintiff '8 prayer for enforcement of a
modifiable sister-state decree and the defendant's plea for
modification of his obligations thereunder. If the accrued installments are modified retroactively, the judgment for a
liquidated sum entered after such modification will be final
and thus will be entitled to full faith and credit in all other
states. (Magnolw. Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 438439, and cases cited.) If the installments are modified
prospectively, the issues thus determined will be res judicata
so long as the circumstances of the parties remain unchanged.
(Snyder v. Snyder, 219 Cal. 80, 81 l25 P.2d 403] ; Ralphs v.
Ralphs, 86 Cal.App.2d 324, 32..5 [194 P.2d 592); Molema v.
Molema, 103 Cal.App. 79, 81 [283 P. 956).) Furthermore, the
interests of neither party would be served by requiring the
plaintiff to return to the state of rendition and reduce her
claim for accrued installments to a money judgment. In the
present case, for example, defendant, a domiciliary of this
state, would have to travel 3,000 miles from his home, family,
and job to secure a modification of plaintiff's allegedly stale
claim and to protect his interests in any proceeding for the
enforcement of his support obligation that she might institute
in New Jersey. If defendant is unable to afford the time or
money to travel to New Jersey to make an effective appearance
in plaintiff's proceedings in that state, his substantive defenses
to plaintiff's claims will be foreclosed. By the same token,
unless plaintiff elected to proceed under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,· which has been adopted
in New Jersey (N.J.S. § 2A :4-30.1-30.22), defendant's failure
to pay the installments as they came due would force her constantly to relitigate his obligation to support. Repeated suits
for arrearages would have to be brought in New Jersey as in·Code Civ. Proc., § 1654: "The remedies provided in this title [the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act] are in addition to and
Dot in Bubstitution for any other remedies."

)
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stallments accrued, to be followed by repeated actions in California to enforce the New Jersey judgments for accrued installments, with the net result that the costs of litigation and
the dilatoriness of the recovery would substantially reduce the
value of the support to which plaintiff is entitled.
[9] Furthermore, there is no merit to the contention that
as a matter of practical convenience the issue of modification
should be tried in the courts of the state where the support
decree was originally rendered. Proof of changed circumstances in support cases is no more difficult than in custody
cases and, as noted above, a California court that has jurisdiction of the subject matter must undertake to adjudicate a
plea for modification of custody rights established by a sisterstate decree. (Sampsell v. Superior Oourt, 32 Ca1.2d 763 [197
P.2d 739].) [10] Moreover, in most states the problem of
modification is dealt with according to general equitable principles, and the law of the state in which the support obligation originated can be judicially noticed (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1875) and applied by the California courts.
[11] Accordingly, we hold that foreign-created alimony
and support obligations are enforceable in this state. In an
action to enforce a modifiable support obligation, either party
may tender and litigate any plea for modification that could be
presented to the courts of the state where the alimony or support decree was originally rendered.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
SPENCE, J.-I dissent.
This case is before us on rehearing. On the first hearing,
no claim was made that the prior New Jersey decree for plaintiff's support was modifiable retroactively as well as prospectively. We therefore assumed in our first opinion that such
support decree was a final judgment, and that it "was entitled to full faith and credit in California." (W orthley v.
Worthley, (Cal.) 267 P.2d 23.) Upon rehearing, it has been
shown that the New Jersey support decree was not a final
judgment for the reason that it was modifiable both retroactively and prospectively under the law of New Jersey. The
majority opinion therefore concedes that "we are not constitutionally bound to enforce defendant's obligations under
it," but it holds that the trial court should have enforced the
New Jersey decree with such modifications as might have appeared proper. I cannot coneur in these view..

)
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Prior to the decision in the present case, this state bas never
sanctioned the modification by its courts of any decree of a
sister state for the support of a wife. (Biewend v. Biewend,
17 Ca1.2d 108 [109 P.2d 701, 132 A.L.R. 1264] ; Handschy v.
Handschy, 32 CaLApp.2d 504 [90 P.2d 123] ; Barns v. Barns,
9 Cal.App.2d 427 [50 P.2d 463].) I would adhere to the established law of this state and avoid the confusion which is
bound to result from the disapproval of the above-cited cases.
(See Barns v. Barns, supra, p. 430.)
Furthermore, the New Jersey judgment which plaintiff seeks
to enforce in California is modifiable retroactively, as well as
prospectively, under the law of New Jersey; but the majority
opinion nevertheless requires its enforcement and modification
by the courts of this state. This will result in confusion worse
confounded, as the courts of each of several states, including
New Jersey, might be called upon to modify the same decree,
both retroactively as well as prospectively. In my opinion, the
New Jersey decree, until made final by the courts of that
state, is based upon shifting sands, which furnish no firm
foundation upon which to predicate a judgment in any other
jurisdiction.
The courts of New York dealt with a similar New Jersey
decree in 1948. (Ohampey v. 01wrnpey, 80 N.Y.S.2d 206.)
The wife there sought to enforce the New Jersey decree in the
courts of New York. The judgment in favor of the wife was
reversed by the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, and it
said: "This action could not be maintained until the amount
of the arrears accruing under the decree obtained in New
Jersey, was definitely fixed by the courts of that state. This
was not done here. Madden v. Madden, 136 N.J. Eq. 132 [40
A.2d 611]." The wife then had the amount fixed by the New
Jersey court and thereafter obtained enforcement of such
final judgment in the courts of New York. (Oharnpey v.
Ckampey, 92 N.Y.S.2d 838.)
With respect to the admittedly valid Nevada decree of
divorce which followed after the New Jersey decree for support
of the wife, this court has held that such a divorce decree
terminates all rights to further payments under a prior decree
for wife support, even though the prior support decree was
entered in this state. (Cardinale v. Oardinale, 8 Ca1.2d 762
[68 P.2d 351].) The majority does not mention the Cardinale
case. It seems illogical to me for this court to hold that the
tl~ai courts here must enforce, as a matter of comity, a prior
New Jersey support decree which is modifiable both retro-

)
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actively and prospectively, when it held in the Cardinale case
that it would not enforce, under similar circumstances, a prior
California support decree which was modifiable only prospectively.
Certain cases cited in the majority opinion are clearly distinguishable. They involved in effect the modification by our
courts of fureign decrees with respect to tho custody and support of children who had become domiciled in this state. Such
matters as custody and support of children are not subject to
binding contracts between the parents, no fina] judgment is
ever entered anywhere with respect to such custody and support, and the state where the children may become domiciled
has a paramount interest in the welfare of such children.
The majority opinion makes reference to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 16501690.) A reading of that act shows that it has no bearing on
the problem before us. It sets up certain procedures for
criminal and civil enforcement, but when the civil procedures
are followed and this state acts as a responding state, it makes
its own initial determination of the amount of support to be
imposed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1682-1683.)
Further, the majority assumes that the present law places
a hardship on plaintiff" by requiring the plaintiff to return"
to New Jersey to obtain a final judgment before seeking to
enforce it here. There is nothing in the record to show that
plaintiff is not still residing in New Jersey or that the law of
New Jersey would require her actual presence for the purpose
of obtaining such final judgment. It appears to me far better
to require that the New Jersey decree should be made final in
that state before the courts of this state should be compelled
to attempt its enforcement or modification.
Under the cited cases, plaintiff has stated no cause of action
for enforcement or modification of the New Jersey decree.
The trial court therefore properly denied plaintiff any relief,
and regardless of the ground upon which the trial court may
have based its ruling, I would affirm the judgment.

Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
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